The End of Philosophy in the Age of Democracy by Vattimo , Gianni
 Le Portique
Revue de philosophie et de sciences humaines 
18 | 2006
Heidegger. La pensée à l'heure de la mondialisation






Association "Les Amis du Portique"
Édition imprimée




Gianni Vattimo , « The End of Philosophy in the Age of Democracy », Le Portique [En ligne], 18 | 2006,
mis en ligne le 15 juin 2009, consulté le 04 mai 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/
leportique/811 
Ce document a été généré automatiquement le 4 mai 2019.
Tous droits réservés
The End of Philosophy in the Age of
Democracy
Gianni Vattimo 
1 When discussing the role of philosophy in late modern and postmodern societies, it is
probably useful to underline the analogies that exist between a work such as “The Open
Society and its Enemies” by Karl Popper and the ideas that Heidegger has discussed in
many of his works, especially in a famous lecture entitled “The End of Philosophy and
theTask of Thought” (1964). This is obviously a paradoxical approach, especially since
Heidegger does not seem like a passionately “democratic” thinker. But the reasons that
motivate  Popper  in  lining  up  against  Plato  are  basically  the  same  that  also  move
Heidegger in his polemic against “metaphysics”, which, as he writes at the very opening
of that lecture, has always been Platonism, that is, from the ancient times to Kant, Hegel
and Nietzsche.  In fact,  if,  instead of  Popper’s  expression “Open Society”,  we use the
Heideggerian term “Ereignis” or “Event”, we shall betray neither the intentions of Popper
nor those of Heidegger’s.  Even if  neither of them would have approved of this small
hermeneutical “violence”.
2 Popper maintains that Plato was a dangerous enemy of the “Open Society” because he
had an essentialist conception of the world. Therein, the real corresponds to a law given
as the eternal structure of Being. A law to which society must simply conform. Since the
one who really knows the essential order of things is the philosopher, he shall, naturally,
be assigned the duty of commanding society. Indeed, the function that philosophers – and
today scientists, technicians, experts – have claimed for themselves for centuries, namely,
that of supreme advisors of the ruling princes, is closely entwined with this basic belief.
According to which, all individuals and societies should confrom to an objectively given
order. An order which is, moreover, regarded as the sole valid source and ground of all
moral norm. 
3 Indeed, a modern principle such as the one that stipulates that “auctoritas, non veritas,
facit legem” has always been subject to rationalistic critiques inspired by “metaphysics”
even when such critiques were underpinned by the best revolutionary intentions. For, in
politics,  wherever  we  are  faced  with  the  “Truth”,  there  arises  the  danger  of
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authoritarianism, that is to say, the very “closure” that Popper stigmatizes in his above-
mentioned work.
4 Now, what Heidegger calls “metaphysics” is precisely the idea that Being is an order that
is objectively given once and for all. This is also what Nietzsche reproaches Socrates with
having promoted in as much as, in Socrates, he sees the beginning of modern decadence
and the killer of the great tragic spirit of the ancient Greeks. If Being is a stable structure
given once and for all, then there can be no possible openness in history. Nor can there be
any “real” freedom. 
5 Clearly,  such  a  vision  of  Being  is  far  more  reassuring  than  the  tragic  one  which,
purportedly, characterized the worldview of pre-Socratic thinkers at the dawn of Greek
thought. 
6 Yet, such a reassurance, one could argue, functions especially well for those who are
secure in the existing order of things and who, for this very reason, deem it as rational
and blessed with eternal validity. (Here, besides Nietzsche, one could also recall the thesis
of  Benjamin  concerning  the  philosophy  of  history).  In  the  first  pages  of  the
aforementioned lecture on the end of philosophy, Heidegger refers to (besides Plato) Karl
Marx as the thinker who, before Nietzsche, had already embarked on the “Inversion” (“
Um wendung”) of “metaphysics” and that of Platonism. With this, I do not mean to say that
it is possible to somehow fill the gap between the Marxist “Inversion” of metaphysics and
its  “Overcoming” (“Überwindung”)  which Heidegger tries  to  prepare through his  own
work. 
7 But neither is  it  absolutely irrelevant to refer to Marxist  ideas on the origins of  the
alienation underlying the social  division of  labour in a capitalist  economy when one
attempts  to  understand,  with  Heidegger,  why  and  how  “metaphysics”  has  come  to
establish itself in such a radically irremovable manner in the context of the history of our
world. 
8 Here,  I  would  also  like  to  set  aside  the  debate  on  the  “historical”  or  the  “eternal”
character  of  “metaphysics”  in  Heidegger’s  thought,  that  is  to  say,  a  theme  whose
examination could probably help highlight Heidegger’s conceptual dependence on the
biblical myth of the “original sin”. A myth of which Heidegger could never completely rid
himself.  Although the notion of  “metaphysics” is  employed by Heidegger in a rather
peculiar way, I think that the analogy, even if paradoxical, with Popper could help clarify
in  which  sense  this  term is  also  used  by  much contemporary  philosophy.  Thus,  for
example, it should not be difficult to recognize it in Wittgenstein (“Die Welt ist alles was der
Fall  ist.  The  world  is  every thing  that  is  the  case:  Tractacus,  1”),  and,  of  course,  in
Pragmatism and Neopragmatism. 
9 Some  philosophers  still  refer  to  “metaphysics”  in  a  way  that  is  terminologically
concordant  with  the  classical  tradition  of  thought  as  well  as  Neo-scholasticism,
particularly that peculiar brand of Neo-scholasticism that is analytic philosophy.
10 In which, “metaphysics” is identified with a set of rigid “regional ontologies”, i.e., the
formal structures and conditions of knowledge. Structures whose conception is deprived
of the elasticity and the historicity still recognizable in the transcendental categories of
Kant and those of Husserl’s. 
11 Nevertheless,  it  is  clear  that  a  great  part  of  contemporary  philosophy  rejects
“metaphysics” in the Heideggerian sense,  that  is  to say,  as  the identification of  true
“Being” with a stable structure that is both objectively recognizable and socially elevated
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as the source of all rules and norms. Even if, as is oft the case, no explicit reference is
made to Heidegger himself. It is precisely on the basis of this rejection of “metaphysics”
understood  in  the  above  sense  –  one  that  may  be  underpinned  by  Nietzschean-
Heideggerian reasons or by the arguments of Wittgenstein, Carnap or Popper – that I
would like to examine the problem of the end of philosophy in the era of democracy.
Better still, by going beyond Heidegger and Popper, I shall argue that we could simply
identify  the end of  “metaphysics”  with the practical  and the political  affirmation of
democratic regimes. 
12 In a democracy, there is no class composed of holders of the real and absolute “Truth”
whose members either directly exert power (Plato’s king-philosophers ) or provide the
sovereign with the appropriate rules of behaviour. This is why, in my view, the reference
to Marx in Heidegger’s lecture is quite symptomatic.
13 One may recall that, therein, the major theme is the end of philosophy as a consequence
of its dissolution in the aftermath of the growing specialization of particular sciences
such as, for example, psychology, sociology, anthropology, logic, logistics, semantics and
cybernetics (contemporary computer science).
14 It’s  easy  to  see  that  this  is  not  at  all  an  abstract  theme for  those  of  us  who teach
philosophy  at  schools  and  universities  and  thereby  experience  the  progressive
dissolution  of  philosophy.  In  the  universities,  where  new  courses  of  psychology,
anthropology and computer science are continually set  up,  enrollment in philosophy
courses has rapidly decreased.  Funds devoted to philosophical  studies are reduced as
well. In the end, all this may seem both very reasonable and yet unpleasant for many of
us and our students. Such a phenomenon may appear to be merely an aspect of the end of
philosophy, one that has nothing to do with democracy. Its emergence could simply be
ascribed to the increasing autonomy of the human sciences. But, as Heidegger points out,
it also reflects the growing social power and prestige of specialists.  A prestige whose
growth portends much greater “scientific” – and less democratic – control on various
aspects of contemporary collective life.
15 In view of all this, one can readily understand that the end of philosophy leaves behind a
vaccum that democratic societies must take into account. 
16 On one hand, philosophy in the sense of the doctrinal supervision of the government of
the “Polis” by the wise is dead. On the other, as suggested by the title of Heidegger’s
lecture that refers to the “Task of Thought” (“die Aufgabe des Denkens”) after the end of
philosophy, the specifically democratic problem of our era remains that of preventing
that the authority of the erstwhile king-philosopher be substituted by the uncontrolled
power of modern day tech nicians in different sectors of contemporary social life. 
17 The latter is a far more dangerous power because it is both more subtle and fragmented.
So much so that the erstwhile revolutionary goal of “striking at the heart of the state”
appears totally unrealistic given that, today, power is distributed among many centres.
Were one to use a psychiatric metaphor, one might say that, with the end of philosophy
and  its  dissolution in  specialized  sciences,  our  world  runs  the  risk  of  becoming  a
schizophrenic one where, sooner or later, a new supreme power will have to arise in
order to make collective life as such possible, even at the cost of our freedom.
18 One could then change the title of Heidegger’s lecture into: “The End of Philosophy in
Democratic Societies and the Political Task of Thought”. 
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19 The sovereign role of the philosopher has ended since the role of sovereigns as such has
ended and belongs to the past. It is not easy to say whether these “endings” are linked in
a cause-effect relationship. Like Marx, Heidegger would say that the end of “metaphysics”
and, consequently, that of philosophy’s claim to absolute doctrinal sovereignty did not
occur because of philoso phers. In his view, this is an “Event” of Being to which the phi ‐
losopher has to “respond”. 
20 Indeed, the difference between Heidegger and Marx would look rather slight were one to
ask where does Being, to which the phi losopher must “respond”, speak? 
21 Being does not speak in the economic-material “structure” of society, as Marx would say
or, in any case, not exclusively there. But when Heidegger encourages us in not satisfying
ourselves  with  the  “daily  presentation  of  what  is  present  as  present-at-hand”  (“die
vorhandene Gegenwaertigung des Anwesenden” in “Zur Sache des Den kens”, Niemeyer 1969,
page 79), we are not just superficially reminded of the Marxian critique of ideology, that
of the “ School of Suspicion” whose basic view is expressed, for example, in Brecht’s
slogan – “what always happens, do not consider it nor mal”.
22 The analogy between Heidegger’s critique of “metaphysics” and Popper’s apology of the
“Open  Society”  –  which  would  have  appeared  absolutely  unthinkable  and  remains
relatively scandalous even today – is not merely a “theoretical” discovery. It “cor-re ‐
sponds” to, that is to say, reflects and interprets the new conditions of our time. For, in
comparison to  the  period in  which Heidegger  and Popper  produced their  respective
philosophical works, the world of today appears much more strongly “rationalized” and
“scientifically organized”. 
23 Likewise, the phenomenon of the end of philosophy and the corresponding structural
schizophrenia that the progress of specialized sciences and technologies promotes, as
mentioned above,  to the point  of  foreshadowing the possible rise of  a  new brand of
authoritarianism (I am thinking of George Bush’s America, of course, but not exclusively)
is infinitely more visible and pervasive. Hence, when I propose the thesis of the relative
and  paradoxical  proximity  of  Heidegger  and  Popper,  I  do  not  claim  that  such  a
comparison can lead us  to  discovering a  more profound “truth” for  that  would still
constitute a “metaphysical” contention (coupled with its characteristic claim to absolute
validity). 
24 Rather,  mine  is  simply  an  attempt  at  “cor-responding”  –  through  the  foregoing
interpretation – to the “Event” in the specifically Heideggerian sense of the term, that is
to say, the concrete situation in which we have all come to live.
25 Following Heidegger, Marx but perhaps not Popper (even though one could argue that
such is the case for him as well), “The Task of thought” in this situation is to think what
remains “hidden” in the “everyday presentation” of what usually happens. For Marx, it is
the dialectical concreteness of interrelations that is concealed by the false consciousness
of ideology and for Heidegger it is truth as “alétheia” or the basic openness of a horizon
(one  might  speak  of  a  paradigm)  which  makes  possible  all  “Truth”  meant  as
“correspondence” to a given state of affairs. 
26 Be such a “correspondence”a matter of verification or falsification of propositions. As I
have already stated,  it  is  not immediately clear whether this effort at  thinking what
remains “hidden” in the “everyday presentation” of the world corresponds to Popper’s
idea of the task of philosophy as well. Indeed, it would seem that the reference to Marx
(whom Popper appreciated) and the “hidden” that remains to be thought would take one
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far away from the notion of the “Open Society”. This problem can not be discussed at
length here and thus one could set aside the specifics of Popper’s view of the task of
philosophy.
27 As  for  Heidegger  and  Marx,  the  question  is  whether  one  may  speak  of  Heidegger’s
“hidden alétheia” as if it were identifiable with the concreteness of the socio-economic
interrelations of  Marx’s materialism. In other words,  how can one define the task of
thought in an epoch in which philosophers no longer (believe that they) have a privileged
access to the eternal “Truth”? A belief on whose basis they would be entitled to govern
society or act as the supreme advisors of the sovereign. Were we to follow Marx exclu ‐
sively, we would return to a “metaphysical” and rationalistic historicism wherein the task
of philosophers would be that of expressing the definitive “Truth” of history. One that
can only be grasped by the expropriated proletariat  and made through a  revolution
spearheaded by it. 
28 If,  on  the  contrary,  we  were  to  follow Heidegger  exclusively,  we  would  risk  finding
ourselves  entangled  in  that  “groundless  mysticism,  bad  mythology,  dangerous
irrationalism” (“grundlose Mystik, schlechte Mythologie, verderblicher Irrationalismus” in “Zur
Sache des Denkens”, cit., ibid.) with which, as Heidegger points out in the mentioned lecture
from 1964, the interpretation of his thought has been invariably bedeviled. In order to
avoid such risks, which bedevil not just the interpretation of Heidegger’s thought but that
of  several  contemporary  philosophies  (at  least  those  which  don’t  wish  to  become
harmless adjuncts of specialized human sciences), one must advance on the path of, to
borrow Jurgen Habermas’famous definition of Hans Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics, “the
urbaniza tion of the Heideggerian province”. 
29 This could mean, I would argue, that one could draw upon an undeveloped passage of
Heidegger’s lecture on “The Origin of the Work of Art” (1936). 
30 In that essay, Heidegger, as is well known, defined the work of art as the “putting into
work of the truth”, that is to say, the site of the occurrence of the “Event” of Being and
the opening of a spe cific historial epoch. 
31 From that moment on, Heidegger developed his “ontology” mainly, if not exclusively, on
the basis of the idea of the “Event” (“Ereignis”). 
32 Heidegger  repeatedly  attempted  to  “en-own”  (“er-eigen”)  the  “Event”  of  Being  by
listening to the founding and inaugural words of great poets such as Hölderlin or the
ancient  wisdom  contained  in the  statements  of  pre-Socratic  philosophers  such  as
Anaximander. But in the mentioned essay from 1936, he also refers to, without further
explanations, other modes of the opening of “truth”, i.e., of the “Event” of Being. 
33 Among them, there is also “the foundation of a state”, that is to say, politics. 
34 It  is  very likely that  he did not  develop his  meditation on this  point  because of  his
unhappy involvement with the Nazis. Nevertheless, I argue that it is important to recall
this allusion to politics as a possible site of the occurrence of the “Event” of Being since,
in the era of democracy, the inaugural “Event” of Being may no longer be the work of art,
but, in some sense, the political “Agorà”. In the epoch of “metaphysics”, the “Event” of
Being occurred in those privileged ontological contexts that were the great works of art.
In this respect, one should equally bear in mind that the great works of art of the past had
always been entwined with the power of the sovereigns (painting, architecture, theatre,
music, and even poetry in different senses). In those privileged expressions, Being still
The End of Philosophy in the Age of Democracy
Le Portique, 18 | 2006
5
spoke in the form of an “Essential Truth” which entitled or, at least, purportedly entitled
the philosopher to the absolute sover eignty of his doctrine. 
35 One may conlude, albeit provisionally, that if we wish to “cor-respond” to the “Event” of
Being in our specific historical situation, we shall have to listen to its voice in a context
that is more akin to politics than art, or, for that matter, any privileged site of a profound
and invisible announcement as such. I have proposed to describe this kind of thought
with a term coined by late Foucault, namely, “l’Ontologie de l’Actualité” or “the Ontology of
the Pre sent”. 
36 The “Event” of Being to which thought has the task of “cor-responding” in the epoch of
democracy presupposes and bespeaks the manner in which Being dispenses itself, from
time to time, in the context of our collective experience. 
37 The “hidden” which tends to remain “un-thought” against the backdrop of increasing
specialization of contemporary sciences is the “on he on”, that is to say, Being as Being or
the whole of our individual and social experience that must be subtracted and freed from
the grip of  modern technological  schizophrenia and its  corollary risk of  relapse into
authoritarian social discipline. 
38 Here, if one still speaks of “ontology” and thereby entrusts philosophers, once again, with
the undertaking of such a crucial task – even though they no longer act as sovereigns or
the  supreme advisors  of  the  sovereign  –  this  could  only  mean that  a  new and still
undefined social  role  for  the  “intellectual”  must  be  imagined.  One  that  would  more
closely resemble that of the “artist” and or the “priest” than those of the scientist, the
technician or the techno crat. 
39 In any case, the “priest” in question here would be one without a hierarchical church and
the “artist” would be more of a “street artist”. 
40 In a less picturesque manner, we might characterize this role as that of a historian’s and a
politician’s, that is to say, someone who does “ontology” in so far as he helps connect our
contemporary  experiences  with  those  of  our  past  history  as  well  as  those  of  other
cultures  and  societies.  Indeed,  building  and  rebuilding  such  a  sense  of  continuity
encapsulates the very meaning of the term “logos” or dis-course. Here, I am also led to
think of  the idea of  the philoso pher as a  “translator” (“Dolmetscher”)  propounded by
Jurgen Habermas. 
41 Does all this have anything to do with “Being”, one might ask? We may well respond: is
“Being” anything different or more pro found and “hidden” than its “Event”?
42 Le texte de Gianni Vattimo fut présenté, pour la première fois et sous la forme d’une conférence, au
cours du XXIe Congrès international de Philosophie organisée par l’Association Internationale de
Philosophie à Istanbul entre le 10 et le 17 août 2003. La traduction de ce texte écrit à l’origine en
italien a été revue par Simon F. O’Li (Oliai).
RÉSUMÉS
« La fin de la philosophie dans l’âge de la démocratie »
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L’époque  actuelle  est  celle  de  la  fin  de  la  philosophie.  Une  telle  fin  équivaut  à  l’abandon
irréversible de la notion platonicienne de « Vérité » comprise comme l’expression d’un ordre
éternel et objectif de tout « ÊTRE ». L’époque actuelle est aussi celle de l’émergence ainsi que de
la consolidation progressive de sociétés démocratiques.
On objectera que, en démocratie, l’ancienne suprématie d’une caste politique et intellectuelle,
fondée sur sa revendication « métaphysique » de la possession exclusive de l’absolue « Vérité de
l’ÊTRE », doit nécessairement être rejetée en faveur d’une conception ouverte de l’ÊTRE comme
« Événement » (« Ereignis ») ce qu’Heidegger a continuellement rappelé après la publication de
sa célèbre conférence sur l’origine de l’oeuvre d’art en 1936. La préoccupation essentielle qui
sous-tend  la  façon  dont  Heidegger  met  en  valeur  le  caractère  réducteur  de  la  conception
« métaphysique » de l’ÊTRE chez Platon est partagée par une grande partie de la philosophie
contemporaine. En effet elle peut servir à établir, quoique paradoxalement, des parallèles entre
certains arguments de textes tardifs et cruciaux de Heidegger comme l’essai de 1964 sur la « Fin
de la philosophie et la Tâche de Pensée » et ceux des philosophes apparemment antithétiques
comme Popper l’a  exposé dans La Société ouverte et  ses ennemis.  On objectera que la tâche
majeure  de  toute  réflexion philosophique lucide  est  de  préserver  ce  qui  reste  caché dans  la
présentation quotidienne de ce qui transparaît dans un monde fortement rationalisé. Un monde
dans lequel le déclin de l’absolu dans l’ontologie et l’influence sociale croissante de l’expertise
technique peut encourager un relaps vers le contrôle social autoritaire. Dans un tel contexte, le
rôle principal de la philosophie est d’affirmer le caractère irréductible de l’Événement de l’ÊTRE
en tant que tel (on he on) et la liberté politique que sa dispensation présuppose.
 “The End of Philosophy in the Age of Democracy”
The  current  era  is  that  of  the  “end” of  philosophy.  Such  an  “end” is  tantamount  to  the
irreversible abandonment of the Platonic notion of “Truth” understood as the expression of an
eternal and objective order of all “Being”. The current era is also that of the emergence as well
as the progressive consolidation of democratic societies. 
It shall be argued that, in a democracy, the erstwhile political supremacy of a specific political
and intellectual  caste  (based on its  “metaphysical” claim to the exclusive possession of  the
absolute “Truth of Being”) must necessarily be discarded in favour of an open conception of “
Being” as “Event” (“Ereignis”) which Heidegger consistently drew upon after the publication of
his famous conference on the origin of the work of art in 1936. The anti-essentialist concern
underlying  Heidegger’s  manner  of  high lighting  the  reductive  character  of  Plato’s
“metaphysical” conception of “Being” is shared by much contemporary philosophy. Indeed, it
can  serve  to  establish,  albeit  paradoxically,  parallels  between  some  of  the  arguments  of
Heidegger’s crucial later texts such as the 1964 essay on “The End of Philosophy and the Task
of Thought” and those of such seemingly anti thetical philosophers as Popper’s expounded in
“Open Society and its Enemies”. It shall be argued that the major contemporary task of all
lucid  philosophical  reflection  is  that  of  preserving  what  remains  “hidden” in  the  everyday
presentation of what transpires in a strongly rationalized world. A world in which the decline of
the  absolute  in  ontology  and  the  growing  social  influence  of  technical  “expertise”  may
encourage a relapse into au thoritarian social control. In such a context, the principal role of phi ‐
losophy is that of affirming the irreducible character of the “Event” of “Being” as such (“on he
on”) and the political freedom that its dis pensation presupposes.
La época actual es la época del final de la filosofía. Este final significa el abandono irreversible de
la noción platónica de « verdad », entendida como la expresión de un orden eterno y objetivo de
cada  « SER ».  La  época  actual  es  también  la  época  de  la  emergencia  y  de  la  consolidación
progresiva de las sociedades democráticas. El papel principal de la filosofía es afirmar el carácter
irreductible del Acontecer del Ser en sí y la libertad política que pre supone su distanciación.
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“Das Ende der Philosophie im Zeitalter der Demokratie”
Die heutige Zeit entspricht dem Ende der Philosophie, das heisst dem unwiderruflichen Verzicht
auf die platonische Idee der Wahrheit  als Ausdruck einer ewigen Ordnung und als Ziel  eines
jeden  “Wesen”.  Das  heu tige  Zeitalter  sieht  auch  die  Emergenz  und  die  progressive  Konsoli ‐
dierung der demokratischen Gesellschaften.  Die hauptsächliche Rolle  der Philosophie besteht
darin  den unreduzierbaren  Charakter  des  "Ereignisses"  vom “Sein”  zu  behaupten,  sowie  die
Voraussetzung der politischen Freiheit als nötige Distanz
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